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spective state and federal constitutional guarantees afforded the
defendant.
People v. Ortega 93 4
(decided July 12, 1991)

A criminal defendant contended that his right to be present with
counsel under the federal 9 35 and state 936 constitutions, as well as
his state statutory rights, were violated when the court held an in
chamber conference with the prosecution's key witness absent the
defendant and all counsel. 937 The appellate division held that the
trial court's ex parte conference with Officer Fritzen, a key
witness for the prosecution, violated the defendant's right to be
present with counsel at all important stages of the trial. 9 38 The
court stated that since the defendant's guilt or innocence was at
issue, "the decision whether [an] informant's identity should be
939
disclosed must not be resolved in an ex parte proceeding."
The defendant, Ortega, was convicted by a jury, of second and
third degree criminal sale of a controlled substance as well as two
counts of possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
The conviction resulted from a sale of cocaine to an undercover
police officer introduced to the defendant by a confidential informant. During the trial, the defendant's repeated requests for
disclosure of the informant's identity were denied. Upon crossexamination by defense counsel, police officer Fritzen, chief witness for the prosecution, refused to disclose the identity of the informant who accompanied him when he purchased the cocaine
from the defendant. The court, in an attempt to resolve the issue,
conducted an in camera conference in chambers with Officer
Fritzen without the knowledge or consent of either side. Again,
Fritzen refused to identify the informant. Subsequently, the court
934. 572 N.Y.S.2d 241 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 78 N.Y.2d 1101, 585 N.E.2d
372, 578 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1991).
935. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
936. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
937. Ortega, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
938. Id. The court's holding was based on People v. Insogna, 28 A.D.2d
771, 773, 281 N.Y.S.2d 124, 128 (3d Dep't 1967).

939. Ortega, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
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placed on record that the purpose of the conference was to inform
Fritzen of a potential Goggins940 problem and to persuade
Fritzen to disclose the informant's identity. Consequently, the
trial court concluded that the informant's identity did not require
94 1
disclosure.
The fourth department, in a brief decision, 942 agreed with the
defendant's argument that his due process rights were violated.
The majority, invoking Goggins, reasoned that "[w]hen the defendant's guilt or innocence is at issue, the decision whether the
informant's identity should be disclosed must not be resolved in
943
an ex parte proceeding."
The dissent noted that the majority did not fault the trial court's
determination that the informant's identity need not be disclosed.
As such, the dissent disagreed with the majority that the defendant's due process right to be present with counsel at all material
stages of the trial had been violated. 944 Instead, the dissent
argued that in order for the defendant to show his right to be
present was violated, he had to show that the "ex parte discussion
was a 'critical stage' of trial, and the defendant's absence
therefrom had a 'substantial effect on his ability to defend.' 945
Additionally, the dissent argued that the Goggins rule was
940. People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d
571, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974). The court of appeals stated that the
decision regarding the informant's identity should not be resolved in an ev
parte proceeding, because it would "arguably trifle with the constitutional
right to confrontation and the right to counsel." Id. at 169, 313 N.E.2d at 44,
356 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
941. Ortega, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 242 (Denman and Boomer, J.J., dissenting).
The trial court's decision was apparently based on the reliability of Officer
Fritzen's testimony identifying the defendant as the seller of the cocaine. Id.
942. The vote was 3-2, with Justices Callahan, Balio and Lowery in the
majority and Justices Denman and Boomer dissenting. Id.
943. Id.
944. Id. The dissent likened the defendant's position in the present case to
that of the defendant in Goggins. In Goggins the court concluded that the
identity of the informant need not be disclosed because proof of the
defendant's identification was not assailed. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d at 168, 313
N.E.2d at 43, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
945. Ortega, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 242 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (1934)).
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inapplicable in this instance as the trial court did not base its
decision on anything that transpired during the ex parte
conference with Officer Fritzen. 946
Lastly, the dissent argued that had the defendant's rights been
violated by the trial court's conduct, it was not reversible error.
The dissent reasoned that the ex parte conference "did not relate
to the substance of the witness's testimony, did not concern
defendant's guilt or innocence and did not relate to the court's
determination that the case did not present a Goggins
problem." 947
Federal case law in this area is governed by Snyder v.
Massachusetts.948 In Snyder, the United States Supreme Court
stated that a defendant has a right under the Fourteenth
Amendment "to be present in his own person whenever his
presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of
his opportunity to defend against the charge. ' 949 However, the
Court cautioned that this privilege is not guaranteed when "the
privilege of presence.., would be useless, or the benefit but a
shadow." 95 0 Instead, the defendant's due process rights
concerning presence are conditioned "to the extent that a fair and
just hearing would be thwarted by his absence ...."951 In sum,
the defendant's right to be present at any stage of the criminal
proceeding is guaranteed only to the extent that it is "critical to
its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the
procedure." 952
The New York decisions are consistent with the federal courts
on the issue of defendant's right to be present at a criminal pro946. Id. at 242-43 (Denman and Boomer, J.J., dissenting). The Goggins

rule states "that 'the decision as to whether the informant's identity should be
disclosed must not be resolved in an ex parte proceeding' ...." Id. (Denman
and Boomer, J.J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163,
168, 313 N.E.2d 41, 44, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012
(1974)).
947. Id. at 243 (Denman and Boomer, J.1., dissenting).
948. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
949. Id. at 105-06.
950. Id. at 106-07.
951. Id. at 107-08.
952. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987).
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ceeding. The court of appeals has regularly cited Snyder when
determining whether the defendant's right to be present has been
violated. 95 3 The defendant does not have an unequivocal right to
be present at all stages of the trial. 9 5 4 Instead, the court of

appeals has recognized that while the "defendant has the right to
be present, with counsel, at all material stages of the trial," 95 5 its
"literal application ... is not demanded."

95 6

Therefore, it appears that under both the federal and state
constitutions a criminal defendant's right to be present is contingent upon whether his absence will have a substantial effect on
his ability to defend himself.

953. See People v. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d 469, 472, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 1071,
568 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722 (1991); People v. Rodriguez, 76 N.Y.2d 918, 921,

564 N.E.2d 658, 659, 563 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (1990); People v. Mullen, 44
N.Y.2d 1, 4-5, 374 N.E.2d 369, 370-71, 403 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (1978).

954. Rodriguez, 76 N.Y.2d at 921, 564 N.E.2d at 659, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
49.
955. People v. Cain, 76 N.Y.2d 119, 123, 556 N.E.2d 141, 143, 556
N.Y.S.2d 848, 850 (1990).

956. See Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d at 5, 374 N.E.2d at 371, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 472
("Common sense dictates that substantial performance of its terms is
sufficient.") Id.
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